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ABSTRACT
RAMETTA, MATTHEW C. Controversies in Industrial Policy: The Creation of an
Explicit U.S Industrial Policy, March 2017
As the world continues to globalize, the United States will need to adapt in its
industrial policy programs in order to stay competitive. As of today, the United States has
no explicit programs to bolster particular industries to increase their performance, but
rather does so implicitly through Department of Defense innovations that spill over into
the private sector. However, we have seen such explicit policies in countries such as
South Korea and China. There has been immense growth in the sectors that have been
targeted by these programs, and this has raised questions about if the United States
should adopt an explicit industrial policy. This thesis uses previous research on clusters, a
new classification for Economic Areas, to inform the development of a U.S tailored
industrial policy. This thesis proposes an explicit U.S industrial policy that targets
clusters, geographic regions that include multiple related industries, and the results are
promising. By using current DOD spending (a measure of U.S industrial policy
expenditure), patent registrations as a measure of innovation, R&D expenditure, and
value added, an accurate picture of what such a policy would do can be extrapolated. This
thesis lays the groundwork for future research into this proposal, because as more data
become available, statistical analyses will become more robust. If the U.S could
capitalize on a program such as the one proposed in this thesis, there could be potential
gains in employment, industry growth, and innovation. In addition, the U.S could see
decreased income inequality if such a program is employed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

A. Background Information
In the last 30 years, trade barriers have fallen dramatically through increased
international cooperation. This, and the emergence of multinational commercial
juggernauts have spurred a new paradigm shift in international economics. As a result of
these changes, however, the question of how to remain competitive in this landscape has
arisen in many countries like the United States. For decades, countries such as South
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have surged in economic growth and innovation due to strong
industrial policy programs supported by the government. In its essence, industrial policy
serves as a tool used by governments to address market failures in order to help
strengthen domestic industry. Some examples of industrial policy range from tax breaks
for specific firms/industries, import controls, etc, and many countries that have employed
these policies have seen great success with such policy. China, for example, has seen
dramatic export growth in its solar panels sector due to targeted policies such as tax
breaks for solar cell firms. In a world where many countries are reaping the benefits of
such policy, the U.S has opted not to follow direct industrial policy. The U.S implicitly
does it through the Department of Defense, since certain innovations are made which
then spillover to the private sector. While ultimately these spillovers can have some of
the same results as more explicit policy, the thesis will explore another, more efficient
option.
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B. Core Thesis Question
The core question of this thesis is, “if a more efficient form of industrial policy for
the United States exists, what would such a policy structure look like and what would its
effects be on the economy?” Many scholars agree that industrial policy is an effective
tool for creating domestic growth, and this thesis follow a similar sentiment. However,
the initial hypothesis is that with a policy model targeting economic clusters rather than
industries or firms, there will be a positive relationship between the strength of clusters
and governmental spending, with innovation in the United States. In addition, this thesis
hypothesizes such a model will be more efficient than the current indirect DOD industrial
policy.
C. Implications
Conclusions from this thesis could have some far reaching and important
implications for economic policy going forward. The U.S appears to be in a situation
currently with low inflation and middling growth overall, and the policy suggestions
arising from this thesis could provide a direction for the U.S to go in hopes of spurring
real long term growth. This thesis has implications for how the U.S could grow in terms
of value added, employment, and innovation.
This thesis proposes a fundamentally different type of industrial policy (one that
targets clusters rather than firms or industries), which could open up new doors for
growth. As discussed later in the thesis, clusters work through capitalizing on external
economies, and therefore investment in those areas could be more efficient than targeting
firms or industries. In addition, such a policy could increase employment by getting
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funding to areas that don’t usually receive it. The more successful a particular cluster
becomes, the more employees they will need.
These policies may also have some positive side effects by implicitly addressing
income inequality. As it stands now, the U.S is one of the worst countries in the
developed world when it comes to income inequality, but in a policy proposal using
economic clusters, there are multiple interconnected industries within a single cluster.
Therefore, more demographic areas are the targets of industrial policy and therefore may
spread job stimulus to more than just one particular industry.
D. Thesis Structure
This thesis will be divided up into four other distinct Chapters (not including this
chapter). Chapters two, three, and four are the core components of this thesis, with
chapter five being the conclusion of the findings. Chapter two deals with the previous
literature on the topic of industrial policy, and will discuss a wide range of scholars.
Some scholars propose differing proposals for the optimal industrial policy, but none
truly discuss the unique U.S case directly, and what should be done there. Chapter three
focuses on analyzing the proposed model of industrial policy, and the rationale for each
variable is dissected carefully. For example, Chapter three also discusses the rationale for
the “three industry” mode of analysis that this thesis employs (choosing to sample three
core industries for the analysis), and why each is included. Chapter four details the data
in greater depth, and then proceeds to exhibit the empirical findings. Regression analysis
and graphing data will be used in this thesis as the primary sources of evidence. Finally,
Chapter four will interpret the results of the empirical data and apply those results to the
real world.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to have a complete understanding of the complexities of industrial policy
and its variability in different countries, an accurate depiction of the existing research
must be detailed. This thesis seeks to answer two core questions: does governmental
industrial policy provide a net societal benefit, and, if so, should the proper model for its
use be the Chinese model of direct intervention, or the U.S model of indirect,
unintentional spillovers from defense department research? Currently, the United States
does not have any kind of official industrial policy while some other countries have
explicit governmental programs in place. With this in mind, the optimal industrial policy
structure in the U.S case will be analyzed. In every one of the following pieces of
literature a point of view that adds to the overall picture of the ongoing debate will be
produced. On both sides, the data used varies from specific trade data (down to specific
goods/parts of goods), to cluster data regarding the external economies of scale and their
specific impact on growth.
A. The Theoretical Background
In order to fully understand the relevant literature set forth in this thesis, the
theoretical framework revolving around industrial policy must be analyzed. The core
economic theory that revolves around this thesis is market failure. Market failure is
defined as a situation in which there is an inefficient allocation of goods and services in a
given industry, firm, or country. As a result of these market failures, we see the
development of externalities, which can be either positive or negative. In the case of
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industrial policy, there are positive and negative externalities associated with market
failure. Examples of these are found throughout the previous literature that this thesis
explores. The theoretical justification for industrial policy, however, is that through
governmental intervention (through subsidy etc.), the government can capitalize on
positive externalities and help level the playing field for the negative ones. In addition,
the concept of external economies is closely related to this thesis. External economies
develop in situations where you have closely grouped firms in a similar industry, such as
we see in Hollywood or Silicon Valley. Because these firms are grouped close together,
there are benefits that help lower their costs such as intellectual spillover, resource
sharing, etc. As we see later in the thesis, the concept of external economies becomes
pivotal in the proposed U.S industrial policy model.
Despite the theoretical arguments for why industrial policy works, there are also
some conceptual arguments that allude to some drawbacks of industrial policy. For
example, there is a risk of experiencing diminishing returns to scale from investment by
government. As we will see later on, Michael Porter discusses the risk of the theoretical
“convergence effects” where industrial policy on a the industry/firm level leads to
decreasing output from investment.
B. Context to the Chinese Case
Industrial policy has a massive impact on the prices of goods on the international
market, because the goal is that by providing governmental support to a domestic
industry, firms will be able to lower costs and export more goods more cheaply. This has
been the case in China specifically, which has served as a good example of direct
governmental intervention in specific industries it wishes to bolster. The most obvious
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example of this has been in China’s solar panel industry. Since 1977, the price of solar
cells has fallen from $76.67/watt all the way down to $0.49/watt in 2016. This dramatic
decrease is in no small part due to the industrial policy employed by China, which Groba
and Cao discuss extensively. For the past 15 years, China has steadily been introducing
new policy that would help the solar sector. For example, in 2001/2003 the Chinese
Government passed legislation that implemented reduced value added taxation for
renewable energy such as solar panels. Since then, “Chinese solar PV exports have
increased by a factor of 26, reaching approximately USD 32 billion in 2010” (2015, p
248) Groba and Cao use a Gravity Model for their empirical research to determine what
the impact governmental policies had on R&D growth and export growth. They use
“energy generated” from solar panels in China to determine “a high demand of, and thus
a large market for” alternative energy. (2015 pp 256-258) They find that, when
controlling for dummy variables meant to indicate when policy programs that include tax
breaks, financial stimulus, etc went into effect, there was clear positive relationship
between such policies and export growth.
C. Proponents of Industrial Policy
Some scholars have outlined significant economic and empirical justification for
governmental support. For example, Doh and Kim (2014) make the case for government
financial support programs by using the example of South Korea. South Korea has
become an economic juggernaut in the last 40 years. Its GDP per capita has gone from
roughly $875 in 1976 to almost $30,000 in 2016. This growth is in no small part due to
their aggressive industrial policy model. In the early 1960’s South Korea outlined a plan
for labor-intensive manufacturing job support, and for rapid technological growth. Since
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then, they have had growth in job creation, company operating profit, and total revenue
by many South Korean companies, especially ICT firms. In setting up their analysis, Doh
and Kim note that specific examples of government strategy for inducing growth has
been, public investment in regional industries, and more specifically financial support for
technological growth. They propose that particularly in Small-Medium Enterprises, there
is a problem due to crowding out by larger corporations. This, they hypothesize is where
governmental investment can come into play. The financial investment into these smaller
industries can help them overcome some of the pressures from larger players (in
particular it allows them to obtain the resources they need) in order to innovate either
with a breakthrough or “incremental innovation.”(2014, 9-10) In particular, they look at
the Korean “Technology Development Assistance Fund” or TDAF, in order to gauge the
growth in financial assistance in this sector. With this data (along with other variables
such as firm age, firm size, R&D expenditures, and patent filings), they continued to run
regression analysis and determined a number of correlations. For example, one revelation
from this study was that expenditures from the TDAF are directly correlated with new
patent/design registrations in small-medium firms. They also found that resource levels
are positively correlated with R&D expenditures, which thereby implies that
governmental support can have a profound impact on the ability for firms to spend more
on innovating. (2014, 17) Kim and Doh provide a concrete case study of a country’s use of
industrial policy (specifically financial investment into technology) to boost firm’s ability
to innovate.
Another scholar who advocates for government strengthening of the private sector is
Montero (2001). He uses the case of Brazil in order to describe what he believes to be a
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successful use of industrial policy. Montero’s model revolves around “horizontal
embededness” which he argues is essential to the success of such industrial policy
because it involves the government getting involved with private entities on a “close,
consultative” (2001, p 52) level. The reason he says this works is because it broadens the
role of the government from that of a financier to more of a co-developer in many cases.
This, he argues, can help prevent a lot of the hitches that occur in the
innovation/production process by sounding off “alarm bells” when progression goals are
not being satisfied. In the case of Minas Gerais, Brazil, the technological development of
the region was unprecedented under the policy that Montero argues for. In this case, the
government would set up small agencies in localities where there could be direct
involvement with industry. Not only would there be financial support, but there would
also be “official planning by national and subnational firms and agencies” (Montero,
2001, pp 56) For example, in 1972 the government sponsored “company of industrial
districts”(CDI) was formed, and it provided logistical, financial, and political support for
rising firms in its given region. The result of this, Montero asserts, can be seen best in the
automotive sector (specifically the Fiat brand) in Minas Gerais. With the cooperative help
of the CDI, which gave land and infrastructure to the industry while also providing
political support, and state government, which gave immense amounts of capital to the
auto industry. Without such government support, the auto industry in this area would
have never been able to compete with other, larger firms that were already established.
However, with such industrial policy, Fiat production in the region went from 26% in
1989 to 44.3% in 1995. (2001, pp 66) Government, he asserts, has increasingly been
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taking on less conventional roles in terms of industrial policy, and that under the
“horizontal embededness” model there should be significant gains to innovation output.
One of the strongest positions on this issue comes from Wade (2016). His primary
thesis revolves around both proving the existence of something called the “Middle
Income Trap”(MIT) in which countries are stuck in low-middle income but cannot break
through to what would be considered “high income” due to “forces analogous to gravity”
(2016, pp 25-26) such as internal forces (poor institutions/rule of law) and external
(orientation within international trade). He goes even further than this and argues that not
only is industrial policy helpful, but it is a necessary condition for escaping the middleincome trap. In support of his argument, Wade notes that in 2014, a World Bank study
concluded that 101 countries were considered middle income, but only 13 could be
considered high income. Wade acknowledges that the actual mechanism by which the
MIT occurs is hard to identify, but some have suggested poor governance or poor
education institutions. (2016, pp 26-27) However, wade’s contribution lies in his
empirical analysis of the MIT mechanism, and how export structure data can provide
clues as to what causes this trap (which then helps explain how to get out of it). He finds
that “per capita income is positively correlated with more diversified production
structure.” He also finds that on the international level, multinational firms tend not to
create “global” production chains, thus sticking with a few of their trusted suppliers in a
few countries which makes it hard for these low-middle income countries to enter the
market.
After Wade has identified the causes of the middle income trap, he is safely able
to propose the solution to the problem; strong industrial policy. He argues that the
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decision to engage in industrial policy boils down to one conditional statement “1) the
market fails (the necessary condition), and (2) the costs caused by the intervention are
less than the costs of leaving the market failure unattended (the sufficient condition)”
(2016, pp 33-35). This falls in line with the theoretical framework discussed earlier,
because the market failed, thus causing the imbalance leading to the middle income trap,
but then industrial policy can be employed in order to counteract negative externalities
created by the market failure (provided that the costs of fixing it are less than leaving the
market failure alone). Wade criticizes those scholars who say that the government role
should simply be to “lead” industry in the right direction, because he says that is a very
narrow and limited use of industrial policy. Wade contends that these middle-income
countries experience market failures, and that industrial policy must be used to capitalize
even further than is usually expected under the usual comparative advantage model. He
says that simply leading countries with industrial policy simply is “stretching”(Wade
pp35) comparative advantage rather than breaking free of it completely and going far
beyond it. He provides examples of this through Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea post
WWII where they experienced changes in comparative advantage far outside the bounds
that it could be “stretched” to.
D. Theories on Optimal Industrial Policy
Spence (1984) explains a few key policy proposals that could increase domestic
industry competitiveness. His ideas are the basis for a lot of the general consensus in
international economics regarding proactive trade policy. In his article, he begins by
discussing the relative market share disadvantage in certain industries and how that can
lead to “cost disadvantages.” For example, in R&D based industries, costs to achieve a
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certain level of innovation are usually fixed. However, there is a “premium” placed on
getting into prime markets that would help pay off the R&D costs, so that forms a cost
disadvantage for smaller industries trying to enter an oligopolistic market (1984, pp356357). In order to counter this, one policy proposal Spence suggests is “blocking of access
to a market,” which is a protectionist policy that involves making it easier for domestic
competitors to enter the market. For example, if a multinational pharmaceutical firm
wanted to sell goods in the U.S but there was a U.S pharmaceutical firm that wanted to
break through to the international market, the U.S impose something like import controls
to make it easier for the U.S firm to be more competitive. Another policy tool he
discusses is government subsidies for specific industries. Spence argues that “subsidies as
‘competitive’ weapons are not really of interest because they simply tip the balance in the
(price) equilibrium in such a way that increases net benefits to the subsidizer”(1984, pp
359). However, he says that subsidies can have a use when the desired effect is to expand
the number of competitors in an industry. Subsidies in this case would lower the costs for
the country’s firms that are trying to break through, and therefore would make it easier
for competitors to grow.
Porter (2012) is an outspoken proponent of industrial policy, and he argues for
something called the clusters mechanism in industrial policy. The core premise behind
the clusters argument is based around the principle of external economies. As discussed
earlier, external economies are when there are groups of firms located in close geographic
regions, that they experience falling marginal costs, spillovers, etc (similar to how a large
firm would but that would be internal economies of scale). The theoretical framework
does support the contention that Porter’s cluster argument is valid, because in the U.S
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Clusters are already an area of falling marginal costs and increased productivity, so it
makes sense to target these areas for industrial policy (at least from simply a theoretical
viewpoint). Porter argues that such a concept can be used to identify regional “clusters”
throughout the United States that are linked with high economic performance measured
in employment (Porter et al., 2012, pp 4-6). For example, Hollywood moviemaking
would be a cluster that experiences external economies of scale, but Porter argues that
you can go even deeper to the “industry-region” level, because they experience clustering
as well. In the analysis, their “findings thus suggest that the positive impact of clusters on
employment growth does not come at the expense of wages, investment, or innovation.”
In addition, Porter et al. find evidence of innovation growth within these clusters as
measured by patent growth (Porter et al, 2012, pp 6-7). In Porter’s model, he identifies
employment growth as the key left side variable, and a number of right side variables
measuring cluster strength and specialization. It is also important to note that Porter uses
percentage changes in his model (logs both sides). He also includes a measure of industry
specialization to see how employment is impacted on this micro level. Industries within a
region are considered to be a size below the clusters that Porter refers to, and these can be
subject to convergence effects, which lower employment growth due to diminishing
returns to specialization. This variable is measured in the “location quotient” which
indicates how “overrepresented” the area’s employment in a specific industry is. Cluster
strength and specialization are measured using an “employment based location quotient”
which measures how concentrated employment is in that industry within that region
(Porter et al, 2012, pp. 20-21). After controlling for a number of Economic Area fixed
effects, they find that the most substantial employment growth is found at those data
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points where there is low industry level specialization but high cluster specialization.
This means that “regional industries that are located in relatively strong clusters
experience much higher growth rates in employment,” (Porter et al, 2012, pp. 25).
In addition, Porter finds a strong, systematic, and positive correlation between
cluster strength and wage/patent growth rates. Overall, Porter concludes that there
should not be a distinction between “industry specialization and regional diversity,”
because as he finds, although industries that are highly specialized and not near
similar economic areas (clusters) will see diminishing returns, industries that are in
clusters with “complementary activity” will see strong growth in wages, innovation,
and employment (Porter et al, 2012, pp 34). This research is the foundation on
which Porter’s paper on industrial policy is built, because he uses cluster theory to
inform his assertions on actual policy.
Porter’s discussion of how best to go about industrial policy revolves around his
conclusions regarding clusters and economic performance. He asserts that “since clusters
involve powerful externalities across firms in a location, and associated public goods,
there is a strong rationale for public policy,” (Porter, 2007, pp. 5). He establishes that
clusters are linked with high economic performance, and he urges governments to
capitalize on these clusters. In laying out the context of his argument, he again says that
dealing with policy at the cluster level avoids many of the inefficiencies that go along
with policy at the industry/firm level. However, the core philosophy regarding Porter’s
suggestions is that he believes such policy should not discriminate on which clusters to
support. He contends that, “cluster policy is thus fundamentally different from sectoral
or industrial policy, whose fatal flaw is their focus on favoring particular types of
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economic activity, picking winners, and attempting to artificially bias competition in
favor of a particular country or region,”(Porter, 2007, pp 6). As a result of this
philosophy, Porter lays out how exactly he builds a framework of his version of industrial
policy (which he calls “Cluster-based policies”). He argues that good policy will avoid
industry/firm oriented programs, use Clusters as a tool to integrate economic policy (they
are inherently organized, and therefore can help guide policy in such a way), focus
federal stimulus around clusters (whether it be financial or otherwise), and set up an
incentives system for the private sector to begin investment in such clusters. With these
general ideas, he has some specific suggestions for how to support such clusters. For
example, he suggests that governments actually formalize the clusters themselves as
actual regions so that targeted investment will be made easier. In addition, Porter
advocates for “Cluster Planning Grants,” in which the designated clusters would compete
for funding, thus increasing the likelihood of innovation through competition. Michael
Porter’s idea is based on the U.S case, which makes his analysis incredibly valuable for
this thesis. His cluster framework will be employed in order to accurately capture what
the best U.S case of industrial policy is.
The supposed “underinvestment” in R&D and innovation by the private sector is
viewed as strong justification for the public sector to supplement these areas. In the
United States, is no explicit industrial policy in place, and so it could be argued that there
is currently “underinvestment” in the key industries that could be producing more
innovation with the proper resources. Tassey (2005) advocates for a better way of
determining not only whether or not there is underinvestment in industrial R&D, but also
a way to find an “optimal” level of investment to provide a net economic benefit for the
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society. His three stage approach is as follows, “(1) identify and explain the causes of the
underinvestment, (2) characterize and assess the investment trends and their impacts, and
(3) estimate the magnitude of the underinvestment relative to a perceived optimum in
terms of its cost to the economy.” Tassey explains that private investors often cannot
provide enough investment to get innovative R&D projects off the ground because of
“market risk and return” factors. (Tassey, 2005, pp. 94) Some of these risks are the
technical complexity of the project, timing, and spillovers/economies of scale. The
technical complexity in particular can be a serious hurdle for investors because,
especially in the early stages of research, the costs are high and the research requires
“multidisciplinary research teams and unique research facilities that do not exist.”
(Tassey, 2005, pp 95) Tassey also seems to agree with Porter’s reservations about
specialization for industries/firms by saying that it “accentuates path dependence” and
forces them to stick to generic, safe innovation plans that are more likely to guarantee
revenue. This is precisely where the security of governmental support could give the push
needed to explore more innovative options. Tassey’s model for estimating the optimal
level of investment in a given industry uses two core variables called Private Rate of
Return (PRR) and the Hurdle Rate (HR). An investment will likely not receive high
private sector funding if its PRR is below its HR because the investment is too risky to
become worthwhile. (Tassey, 2005, pp 100) Also, Tassey’s model suggests that there is
also a variable called Social Rate of Return (SRR). Something that has a high SRR would
be something that has a high public good, such as infrastructure or basic research.
However, just because something has a high SRR does not mean that it will have a high
PRR, and oftentimes PRR wouldn’t be close enough to the HR to substantially justify
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private investment in goods that cause high social benefit. This is where he argues
government comes in. Tassey asserts that projects such as basic research are prime
“candidate(s) for government financial assistance, usually in the form of cost- shared
funding for the conduct of generic technology research. Cost sharing reduces risk enough
to stimulate initial private investment in applied R&D.” (Tassey, 2005, pp 100) However,
Tassey does not believe that governmental support is the final answer. He believes that
ultimately, as a government is able to get PRR over HR in an industry, that subsidies can
be “phased out” and private investment will be stimulated enough to continue to
innovate. (Tassey, 2005, pp 105) Tassey also notes that government investment is an
imperfect mechanism because each dollar spent does is not 100% efficient in creating
innovation. For example, he cites the fact that “the Department of Defense spent $570
million on research between 1987 and 1995,” but despite this investment, “the overall
market had not reached $1 billion in annual sales by 1996.” (Tassey 2005, pp. 108) In his
conclusion, Tassey cites the importance of his three stages again, because with their use
industrial policy will be significantly more effective for finding the optimal level of
investment.
E. Skeptics of Industrial Policy
Although they are few in number, there are those scholars who are a bit more skeptical of
the benefits from industrial policy. The core idea behind industrial policy is to provide
net utility to the country that is attempting to do it, but there are a few who suggest more
modest policy due to the fact that there may be more consequences than previously
imagined. Baldwin and Krugman (1988) argue that there are some hidden consequences
to industrial policy, and they use the context of the wide-bodied jet aircraft industry as a

21
context for their analysis. In particular, they create a model revolving around two of
Airbus and Boeings competing models; the A300 and the 767. In this case, Boeing was
the established giant in this industry, and a European consortium “subsidized ” Airbus’s
production. The European governments that supported Airbus denied claims that they
were using subsidies since they expected to be paid back in full contingent on Airbus
making a profit. (Krugman et al, 1988, pp 46). Regardless of the semantics, Krugman
argues that this subsidy allowed Airbus to enter the industry by lowering production
costs. This entrance lowered the global price for wide-bodied aircraft, but Krugman
argues that there were some troubling welfare effects that must be taken into account
when looking at the effects of the subsidy. The United States is obviously hurt from the
increased competition on the world market, but he uses a model centered around allowing
for “intertemporal demand subsitution” (net effect on consumption from changes in new
competition) to get more precise measurements. Krugman finds that the U.S actually
received a net loss of $3 billion from Airbus entering the industry. However, he finally
concludes that, ultimately, whether or not the subsidy was worth it depends on the
discount rate of Europe. With this in mind, however, he notes that in order for the subsidy
to be worth the investment, Europe would need a discount rate of 3% or below. He argues
that “On net, Europe loses (except for the low 3 percent discount rate), the United States
loses, and the rest of the world gains.” (Krugman et al, 1988, pp 69) Therefore, he is
unsure whether or not such policy is worthwhile because it depends on what a country’s
discount rate is (this is extremely hard to determine). However, if the discount rate were
high, the losses in the Airbus case would’ve been astronomical (up to $9 billion).
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(Krugman et al, 1988) Although Krugman does not give an outward rejection of
industrial policy, he is skeptical and is simply more cautious about certain uses of it.

F. Conclusion
As the world becomes more globalized, some countries are trying to find ways of
remaining competitive. Production chains are becoming more fragmented, and
increasingly countries in the low-middle income bracket are finding it hard to break
through into the global production chain. The world has established players whose costs
are lowered from scale economies, and for a given country trying to enter, it can be hard
to compete. However, even for larger countries like the U.S, the desire to capitalize on
market failures has proved difficult given that they do not currently participate in any
kind of explicit industrial policy. As of right now, the U.S DOD employs implicit
industrial policy, in which spillovers from the DOD spur innovation for the private
sector. However, the optimal U.S industrial policy could be derived by using a model that
employs the “cluster” level that Michael Porter advocates for. Policy that targets the
cluster level is much more likely to be successful since it does not encounter the same
convergence effects seen at the industry/firm level, which makes it a very strong starting
point. Beyond this, numerous authors have offered their opinions on the best way to
conduct industrial policy ranging from “horizontal embededness” as cited by Montero, to
Wade who argues that comparative advantage needs to be broken through completely.
Another key contribution for this thesis is that by Doh & Kim, which emphasizes the
importance of using patent registration (a surrogate for innovation) as the goal of
industrial policy.
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The relevant literature provides a good framework to begin the construction of a
strong industrial policy tailored to the United States. The United States is unique in that it
is a net importer (whereas most of the countries currently employing aggressive industrial
policy are net exporters), but it is also one of the worlds leading global economies. It also
has one of the most disparate income distributions in the entire developed world, and
therefore requires a solution that will ensure more areas of the economy are impacted
than just a handful of targeted industries.
G. Methodology
This thesis seeks to determine the optimal U.S industrial policy, which is a difficult
task given that the U.S currently does not have any such explicit industrial policy. The
definition of “optimal” in this case is in regards to the industrial policy that is the most
efficient in addressing the market failures present in the U.S economy. The justification
for enacting such a policy could be the potential growth in GDP, increased exports, less
income inequality, and greater domestic employment. Chapter 3 will explore the
justification for our methodology in greater detail.
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL

In this chapter, there will be a comprehensive analysis of the model that
will be used to determine the optimal U.S industrial policy. However, there is an
initial challenge to determine what model would best fit the United States, given
that there is no such explicit policy currently in place. This thesis will justify the
model, however, by breaking down the rationale for each included variable, while
also providing informational context for that variable. Section A will discuss the
important things that the model must do in order to be viable, while each
succeeding section will discuss individual variables and their historical context,
data sources, and the rationale for it’s inclusion.
A. What an Optimal Model Must Do
In order to have an acceptable model for a new U.S industrial policy, there
are a few things that it must include. The goal of the model is to ultimately create a
form of industrial policy that is more efficient than the current U.S method
involving the DOD expenditures, so that is the underlying philosophy that must
inform every aspect of the model. As this thesis determined earlier in the
discussions revolving around Porter, targeting clusters for industrial policy appears
to be the optimal starting point for the U.S case. Using clusters seems optimal for the
U.S (as exhibited by Porter) and if used in a more explicit U.S industrial policy, it could
strengthen multiple industries at the same time because of external economies (which

25
could help with income inequality). There may be a concern that using clusters along
with “industry level” data may cause some conflict for statistical analysis. However,
clusters are simply geographic areas of related industries, which means that other
variables, such as innovation and investment, will be able to stay at the industry level
while still using clusters in the model.
This model must also have a clear variable for governmental input. The nature of
industrial policy is that the government invests through some means (grants, contracts,
etc) and then they expect to get some kind of gain out of their investment. In addition,
there also obviously must be a measure with output that matches up with the input. This
would be the left side variable in our model, and would go up or down depending on a
change in governmental input. An example of this kind of output would be innovation,
because if the government were funding a certain area, they would like to see more
innovation as a result.
B. Current U.S Industrial Policy
Unlike other countries such as China or South Korea, the U.S does not outwardly
attempt to bolster domestic industry though industrial policy. Instead, there is a more
implicit version in which organizations such as the Department of Defense spend money
on certain sectors in order to innovate for military use. This can, however, create some
innovation in the private sector, because the creation of a core technology by the DOD
could result in spillovers to the private sector. For example, Epinephrine, a universally
used emergency medication for people with severe allergies, was actually created by the
DOD for military use. Originally, it was made to allow soldiers to survive a chemical
attack (Reinmann, 2016). However, over time there was a spillover into the private
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sector, and Myelin then created the Epi-Pen, which could be used for a severe allergic
reaction.
While this type of industrial policy has been going on for years, other countries
have been thriving and seeing massive expansion

Figure 1

due to a more explicit approach.
Therefore, it could be that the DOD
approach is not the most efficient
way, so this thesis will propose a new
model using clusters, current U.S
DOD expenditure in particular
industries, and innovation as
measured by new patent registration. As seen in Figure 1, the U.S defense spending has
largely been a steady (if slightly declining) portion of GDP since World War II, and since
the U.S currently has no dedicated program to industrial policy it stands to reason that
less money is going towards the growth of private industry. The model for this thesis is
below. Each individual variable will be discussed in depth later in the thesis.
Pit= Bi +Bt+B1CSit+B2Iit+B3RDit+B4VAit ai+ar
Where Pit is patent registration by industry over time, Bi is a fixed effect for industry,
and Bt is the fixed effect for time. CSit indicates the specialization levels (strength) of a
cluster (in an industry over time), and Iit indicates the level of investment in a given
industry over time. RDit and VAit are the control variables “research and development
spending” and “Value Added.”
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Despite the fact that the U.S does not engage in explicit industrial policy, this thesis
proposes an innovative way of estimating the impact of using a cluster-based policy.
It its essence, the core relationship in this thesis is one of inputs and outputs.
Inputs would be considered investment (or potentially other forms of support) by a
government under industrial policy, and output would be what the government would like
to get out of its investment (in this case, innovation). Luckily, truly explicit industrial
policy is not needed in order to estimate this relationship because we only need to know
the relative effect on innovation from a given amount of investment. For example, if one
looks at the current U.S DOD spending in pharmaceutical research (its likely for military
use), and also observed that there was also innovation growth in the private
pharmaceutical sector, then we can extrapolate those results to inform the usefulness of
more direct industrial policy. Essentially, since there is currently no explicit industrial
policy in the U.S, as long as we see that a relationship exists between investments an
innovation, it would be sensible to assume that the same relationship would exist in a
hypothetical explicit form of industrial policy.
With all of this information in mind, a coherent framework of analysis can be
built. This thesis uses a model that takes into account the relationship between innovation
and investment through the lens of clusters. The relativistic aspect to this analysis allows
for an accurate way to devise industrial policy even when such a policy is not in existence
yet.
C. Data Set and Methodology
In order to capture the impact of investment and clusters on innovation, there is a
very specific setup for the data set that must be used. The type of data that are used in this
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thesis is panel data, which allows for both a time-series aspect, and a cross sectional
aspect. This is crucial, because simply exhibiting the change in innovation over time
when compared to the change in investment and cluster specialization over time misses
the important cross sectional component to industrial policy. Not all industries in the
United States are the same, and there may be differences in the resulting innovation from
a given amount of government spending. Therefore, this thesis uses a sample of three
different industries, Information Communication Technology (ICT), Biopharmaceuticals,
and Aerospace Manufacturing. For each industry, there are data on patent registration,
cluster specialization, and government spending over the period of 2007-2013. The fact
that this thesis uses panel data was actually key in determining what data to use, because
each database had to include both the same time range, and the same industry in order to
stay consistent.
D. Justification for Selection of Industries
An integral decision in this thesis was the selection of Biopharmaceuticals, ICT,
and Aerospace manufacturing as the key industries that will be measured. The industries
must each capture a portion of the U.S market that is significantly different than the
other. At the same time, there must be enough industries to ensure that there is sufficient
data for a regression analysis. Finally, each industry must also represent an area that the
U.S conducts significant international trade. Since the purpose of this thesis is to find the
optimal industrial policy (ultimately to make the U.S competitive in markets
internationally), it stands to reason that the industries used in this analysis should be those
that are currently robust trading sectors. This is in line with what other scholars have
done in order to measure the impact of clusters. For example, Porter et al. (2012) elected
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to use “traded industries” in contrast to local industries because of the fact that traded
clusters “concentrate in particular regions but sell products or services across regions and
countries.” This gives a far more accurate representation of U.S trade. For example, using
the “Apparel” industry in the U.S would not be a strong industry for analysis because of
the fact most apparel production is done outside the country.
ICT is a booming industry in the United States right now, and therefore it was one
of the frontrunners for application in this thesis. ICT is a broad industry that encapsulates
telecommunications via telephone lines, wireless networks, computers, and various other
audio-visual networks. This industry also includes digital storage, software, and the
integration of these services into consumer products. The United States currently ranks
6th in the worldwide share of the ICT market (OECD, 2016), and according to the “ICT
development index,” a benchmark of ICT performance across countries, the U.S only
ranks 14th in the world (Information Technology Union, 2014). Other countries such as
South Korea (ranked #1), have incorporated strong industrial policy, and there could be a
connection between strong industrial policy and ICT performance. In the case of this
study, ICT is a prime candidate for analysis because it is a highly connected/traded
market, and would be one of the first targets of good industrial policy.
Biopharmaceuticals is another key industry in the United States, but also one that
is highly traded. “Big Pharma” is a phrase that gets tossed around a lot today, but it
accurately represents the size and scale of the U.S pharmaceutical industry. Many of the
largest pharmaceutical companies in the world are U.S based (Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson,
etc), and the U.S has the largest Pharmaceutical industry by far with a value of roughly
$3.5 Trillion. The closest competitor is Japan with a size of just $940 Billion, and clearly
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it is a massive worldwide industry for the U.S (World Atlas, 2016). The
biopharmaceutical industry will have no shortage of data, and would be representative of
a distinctly different U.S market than ICT. Also, given that the Biopharmaceutical
industry is very heavily R&D based, strong industrial policy would be extremely helpful
in reducing the costs of research, thus allowing for greater innovation/product creation.
Finally, the U.S Aerospace industry was selected because of its large size on an
international scale, the fact that it is sufficiently distinct from both
ICT/biopharmaceuticals, and also its unique market structure (its very much an oligopoly
worldwide). In the U.S, the aerospace market includes both commercial and military
aircraft, along with spacecraft manufacturing/development. The U.S Aerospace Sector
contributed $144.1 Billion in export sales in 2015 alone, and provides 500,000 jobs in
direct scientific/technical work along with 700,000 related jobs (USA Investment
Summit, 2015). Big manufacturers such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin dominate the
Aerospace market, and although there are currently large government contracts in the
military/spacecraft areas, there is not much government investment in other areas such as
civilian aircraft manufacturing/R&D. The Aerospace sector in particular provides a
unique market structure (an oligopoly), and this will provide the variety in the data set is
needed for a strong empirical analysis.
The ICT, Biopharmaceuticals, and Aerospace industries provide strong variation,
size, and potential for investment through an optimal U.S industrial policy. Therefore,
these three industries will be used in the data set, and each will have a set of variables,
(innovation, cluster strength, and government investment) along with a set of years to
complete the panel data set.
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E. Measuring Innovation (Pit)
Measuring the output from industrial policy can be difficult because there are a
number of different ways to do it. One could look at company revenue growth in dollars,
or value added, etc. However, this thesis will measure output through innovation in a
given industry, because innovation is one of the core drivers of growth. If an industry is
experiencing a lot of growth in innovation, then we should expect that that industry
would see greater economic growth. In order to measure innovation, patent registration in
a given sector will be used. Patents are helpful because they are widely used as a measure
of new ideas/innovation, so if you see that over time there are more patents in a given
sector, then that industry has innovated more. When used in conjunction with cluster data
and investment data, the potential relationship between investment in clusters and
innovation could be observed. It should, however, be noted that there is a potential issue
with the use of patents as a measure of output from industrial policy. This is the fact that
patents are a real number, whereas other data in the model will primarily be used in
dollar terms. If it were the case that using patents became problematic, value added
would be a viable substitute since it is also in dollar terms.
The patent data needs to have both a time aspect, and an industry aspect. Since the
data set this thesis uses is a panel data set (three industries over time), the patent data
will need to match up. By using the US Patent and Trademark office, these data are
available by both the NAICS Code (classifies a patent by a certain economic
activity/industry). NAICS has largely replaced the older version of industry classification,
the SIC code, and therefore this will be the categorization standard this thesis will use.
Within this database, the data goes back as far as 1964 and provides the number of
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patents in that sector for a given year. For example, one sector that is used in this thesis is
the Biopharmaceutical sector. Therefore, all the patents for a given set of years in the
“Pharmaceutical and Medicine” industry (NAICS code: 3254) would be used in the data
set. The same thing would be done for the remaining two industries.
F. Justifying and Measuring Clusters
Clusters are the key differentiator from previous research for this thesis. Clusters,
as Porter (2012) proposes in his works, are the optimal target for industrial policy
because they take advantage of external economies. The inclusion of Clusters as the
economic area of analysis is justified because of the fact that the U.S has shown to see
more wage, innovation, and employment growth in clusters rather than industries or
firms. Measuring clusters, however, proves to be an immense challenge because they are
a novel economic area without any accepted unit of measurement. Luckily, Porter and
Harvard Business School have developed a way of understanding the
strength/specialization of a given cluster. In a database created by Harvard and the U.S
Economic Development Administration, they created and defined the much sought after
unit of measurement, the Location Quotient. The Location Quotient is defined as the
“Ratio of an industry's share of total state employment in a location relative to its share of
total national employment. Measures the specialization or concentration of a cluster in a
particular location relative to the national average, with an LQ > 1 indicating higher than
average cluster concentration in a location.” (U.S Cluster Mapping Project, 2014) This
means that the higher the LQ, the more specialized/concentrated a given sector is in that
cluster.
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By using clusters in this model, it will be possible to discern whether or not a U.S
industrial policy targeting particular geographic areas will yield the most innovation.
Because of the benefit of external economies that we see in clusters, the U.S should get
most “bang for its buck” by using clusters, meaning that a dollar investment (or R&D
expenditure) will go further by targeting clusters rather than industries or firms.
Theoretically, Porter has laid out why Clusters work for the United States, but they will
need to be tested empirically before confirming their viability in the optimal U.S
industrial policy.
G. Measuring Governmental Input
This thesis required a concrete measurement of U.S government expenditure (which
is investment by nature) for an explicit industrial policy, but at the same time there is
currently no such policy in existence. However, as discussed previously, the U.S
Department of Defense has been doing this implicitly for many years, and therefore it
stands to reason that historical data from DOD expenditure in specific sectors could be
used to extrapolate on to what an explicit policy would entail. There are few other ways
to gauge the level of investment ongoing in the U.S for use in the private sector, and
since we know that spillovers occur into the private sector from the DOD, this
methodology appears to be sound.
Measuring investment through DOD spending in given sectors is a challenge, but
it is made possible through government records. The use of the Department of Defense,
however, even impacts the types of industries that are used in the analysis. For example,
it would be reasonable for the DOD to invest in the Aerospace sector via contracts, but
there would be very little reason for it to invest in the Agriculture sector. Therefore, each

34
industry used in this analysis had to be a theoretical fit for the DOD, otherwise the data
would be skewed due to unrepresentative investment numbers.
H. Control Variables Justification
The use of research and development as a control variable is essential to ensuring that
there is no omitted variable bias in the regression analysis. Levels of research and
development in a given sector will obviously have an impact on the level of innovation
(patents) in that sector. If there is more research and development spending, there will be
more resources available for the creation of new ideas, products, and tools. The level of
research and development spending in a given industry, therefore, can be reasonably
assumed to have an impact on the level of innovation in a sector, and thus must be a
control in the analysis.
Using value added as a control variable may be considered contentious at first, but
upon closer analysis, it makes sense that the size of a given industry could impact the
level of innovation. Although a lot of this thesis so far has discussed external economies
as a key factor in predicting levels of innovation, there is also an “internal economies”
aspect that must be controlled for. As is taught in Economics 101, the larger
firms/industries get, the more spread out their fixed costs get. Lower costs can mean
greater available resources for innovation, and thus there must be a control variable to
represent this. Value added (by industry by year), is exactly the variable that does this,
because it exhibits a particular industries size at the time. This variable would be
controlling for the scenario where a larger industry is able to innovate more than a
smaller one due to internal economies, and therefore it must be included as well.
However, it is important to note that the core phenomenon occurring in a cluster based
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industrial policy is external economies, value added is simply a control (unless using
patents is problematic, in which case value added will become the dependent variable).
I. Conclusion
The model for the optimal U.S industrial policy needs to be able to best estimate the
impact of investment (in a cluster economy) on innovation. By using patents for
innovation, DOD spending for investment, and the Location Quotient for cluster
specialization, the model will be as close as is possible (without actually employing
explicit U.S industrial policy in the real world) to determining the optimal U.S policy. In
the next chapter, the specific data that are used will be detailed further, regression
analysis will be employed, and finally, the results will be presented and interpreted.
Through this analysis, the implications of such a policy can then be discussed.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA AND RESULTS

Now that the model has been dissected piece by piece to understand the rationale
for each of its parts, a more in depth data analysis will be conducted in this chapter. In
addition, the framework for a regression analysis will be created, and then the results of
the empirical work will be exhibited and interpreted. The goal of this section will be to
say definitively if the optimal U.S industrial policy is one that targets clusters with
governmental funding. The data that are used in this thesis will (units, sources, etc). In
order to do this, there will be multiple different avenues of statistical analysis including
regressions and graphing.
A. DOD Investment Data
In order to accurately measure the real, current DOD expenditures in each of the three
industries (ICT, Biopharmaceuticals, and Aerospace), the data needed to be annualized.
Without an annualized measure of DOD expenditure, there would be no way to create the
panel data set that was required for this thesis. Unfortunately, there was no readily
available “pre-annualized” data set for DOD expenditure, but given the importance of the
use of panel data, a new way to annualize the data needed to be constructed. To do this,
the initial data were gathered from the USA spending database, which holds all of the
current U.S investment data for all industries, all government agencies, and in multiple
different forms (grants, contracts, etc). The spending data were presented on a
transactional level, meaning that each individual contract, grant, etc is logged in this
database. In a given industry, there were hundreds of thousands of transactions in the
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time period given in the database, and the database did not provide the total spending in a
year. This was seemingly problematic, but it was overcome due to data customization and
some work in Microsoft excel. In particular, the data sets could be customized to include
only the investment data for the particular industry, agency, and form of the users
choosing. For example, in the case of the ICT sector, the search on the USA Spending
database was narrowed down to only those investments made in the ICT sector. The ICT
sector was identified through the NCAIS code, a unique industry identifier used for both
patent and investment data. In addition, including only those investments made by the
Department of Defense narrowed the data down even further. Finally, once the dataset
included just DOD expenditure in the ICT industry, there were 8250 transactions from
2007-2015 (the only available time frame for the database). In order to change the data
set from the transactional format to the annual format, the sum all of the transactions
within a given year was calculated, thus providing one annualized number for how much
money the DOD spent on the ICT sector in one year.
This process was repeated for each of the other two industries, with roughly 7-10
thousand transactions per industry that were then annualized for use in the panel data set.
The unit of measurement for the DOD spending was originally just dollars, but in order to
make the spending data match the other variables, the units were changed into millions of
dollars in the data set.

B. Cluster Data
As discussed in Chapter 3, the unit of measurement for a given clusters strength
and/or specialization is the Location Quotient. However, the process of readying this data
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for regression was far more involved than simply plugging it into Eviews. These data
were sourced from the U.S Cluster Mapping Project, which provides Location Quotient
data in the form of a map or an excel file. In order to better visualize what this data looks
like in practice, a map of the ICT sector is

Figure 2

viewable in Figure 2. In this
map, the areas that are
shaded blue or turquoise are
the ones with above average
levels of specialization. For
example, in the “Boise
City” Cluster, which
includes parts of Idaho and Oregon, the value of the location quotient is 4.01, which is
significantly above average in the ICT sector. The data from this map, when downloaded
to a Microsoft Excel file, has the LQ data for the year selected in every cluster shown.
The issue with the cluster data was that there was no single LQ value for a given year,
but rather there were 181. In order to preserve the measured change in LQ over time
while still making the data useable in a panel data set, the median LQ value for all
clusters in a given year was used as the singular value for that year. The use of the
median is justified due to the fact that it would not be skewed by high LQ values as the
mean is, and thus it would be a reliable indicator of a “typical” U.S cluster. In addition,
this approach was necessitated by the fact that DOD expenditure data was not available
by individual location, and so in order to have an accurate statistical analysis, the cluster
data needed to match up with all the other data.
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C. Patent Data
The patent data for this thesis were the least troublesome to obtain, although there
were a few things that needed attention in order to ensure consistent results. The data
were gathered from the US Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), which stores every
domestic registered patent since 1968. Again, in order to ensure that the industries lined
up correctly the exact NCAIS code that was used for spending was used to find the
industry for this data set. The only issue with the industry summation data set was that it
only went up to 2012, but the individual technology patent data went up to 2015.
Therefore, a manual summation of all groups of technologies within a particular industry
was conducted for 2013, 2014, and 2015. This yielded an accurate estimate of the number
of new patent registrations an industry had in those years. The unit of measurement used
for patents in this thesis is simply the number of new patent registrations in a year.
D. Control Variables
The research and development variable data were gathered from the OECD, and
was measured in millions of dollars just like the DOD spending variable. In this case, the
entire data set needed to be limited because of the fact that the R&D data only went up to
2013. After extensive research to find any industry level R&D data for the 2014-15 years,
the results were unsuccessful, and therefore the 2014-2015 years needed to be omitted
from the sample. However, the addition of a new cross section for the regression
ultimately outweighs the loss of the two years. Although the two lost years removed
some observations, a similar amount were added back on due to the fact that there was
R&D data for three separate industries.
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The value added data were gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), and was also measured in millions of dollars. The range of this data is from 2007
to 2013 and also is across the three core industries of analysis. One small hiccup arose,
but it was corrected during the data collection process. In the BEA database, there were
two separate categories for ICT, one for “manufacture of computer, electronic, and
optical parts,” and another for “information and communication.” To address this, the
sum of these two value added categories were taken to account for the entire size (in
value added) of the ICT sector.
E. Empirical Analysis
The following section will exhibit the setup, execution, and analysis of the empirical
data for this thesis. The program used for the statistical analysis was Eviews 8, and all
data were imported from Microsoft Excel. There were 21 observations in the sample (7
years X 3 industries = 21 observations) for each variable. A complete breakdown of the
Eviews name for each variable is viewable in Appendix 1: Figure 4. In this analysis, there
were a total of five regressions run, each offering a different approach to understanding
the results of this new model. In order to account for multicolinearity, a correlation
matrix was also run. There is also extensive analysis of scatter graphs, which actually can
say a lot about the relationship between the variables.
The first step before analyzing the data is to generate a correlation matrix, and
although the results weren’t perfect, many of the variables did not exhibit
multicolinearity. As seen below in Figure 3, R&D was highly correlated with value added
and moderately correlated with cluster
specialization, and value

Figure 3
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added was correlated with cluster specialization. Despite these few hiccups, the rest of
the variables were normal, and much of the multicolinearity problem was taken care of
during the regressions.
Even from the initial graphic analysis, some interesting patterns begin to emerge
about the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. For example,
one key result is seen from the suggestion of a possible positive trend between DOD
expenditure and patents. As seen below in figure 4, there is an upward trend; the more the
DOD spends, the more patents we see registered (when excluding Aerospace). However,
there is a very interesting discovery from this graph, which is the clear difference in gains
from investment between industries. There are clearly

Figure 4

three distinct patterns that emerge from
this information, and because each industry
has a differing relationship between DOD
spending and patents. The obvious
example in this graph is the aerospace
industry. Unlike in the pharmaceutical and
ICT industries, there appears to be a flat
trend between DOD spending and patent
registration. This phenomenon, however, is likely due to the fact that in the Aerospace
industry, funding is almost exclusively done through very long-term contractual
agreements. This means that the potential innovation gains from government investment
would not be seen for a number of years, and thus could not be reflected in the short
seven-year sample from this data set. It is also important to note that this thesis is not
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necessarily asserting that there is a causal relationship between these variables, but rather
there is a possible correlation. In addition, there are likely other variables that are
influencing patents that this graph does not capture, so while there is important
information to be gained from this, it is far from perfect. The disparities between
particular industries can be seen in other variables as well such as cluster specialization,
value added, and R&D. Other graphs exhibiting this phenomenon can be seen in
Appendix 1: Figures 2 and 3.
F. Regression Results
On this page and the next are the results of each of three core regressions ran during
this thesis. Each will be detailed separately to discuss the rationale, results, and changes
made between regressions.

Dependent Variable: Patents

Regression 1

Value Added

0.007
(1.69)*
-17973.04
(-2.527)***
0.515
(0.317)
N/A

Cluster Spec
DODSpend
Clusterspec*DODspend
R&D
AR(1)

0.1689
(4.74)***
N/A

AR(2)

N/A

N

21
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Dependent Variable:
Value Added
Patents

Regression 2

Regression 3

Regression 4

N/A

N/A

Cluster Spec

N/A

-18.673
(-2.57)***
N/A

DODSpend

N/A

N/A

N/A

Clusterspec*DODspend

510.269
(4.249)***
9.240
(5.849)***
N/A

499.383
(2.340)***
5.300
(14.622)***
N/A

AR(2)

238.99
(1.47)*
3.346
(2.95)***
0.933
(14.45)***
N/A

N

12

0.353
(3.401)***
10

0.402
(1.632)*
10

R&D
AR(1)

Year
Fixed Effects
t-stat
in parentheses
* p<.20 **p<.10 *** p<0.05

N/A

Regressions 2-4 do not include AerospaceYes
See Regressions in Appendix 2

a. Regression 1
The first regression was the obvious initial step after formulating the initial
model. In this regression, all of the core variables are regressed with all industries used.
In addition, as stated in the model, Patents, a measure of innovation, are used as the
dependent variable. However, even after attempting to modify the regression with time
and cross sectional fixed effects, the results presented were the best available. There were
issues with regression 1 in the value added, cluster specialization, and DOD spending
variables.
The issue with the value added variable is that, although it had the expected
positive sign, it was only significant at the 20% level, which is a questionable measure of
statistical significance. One of the most troubling issues is the fact that the cluster
specialization sign was negative and significant. This is the exact opposite of what the
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hypothesis predicted, and it would not be sensible to argue that as a cluster becomes more
specialized that you see a decrease in innovation. This would fundamentally disagree
with Porter et al’s research on clusters, and therefore it had to have been an issue with the
regression. Another issue was that DOD spending was not statistically significant, even at
the 20% level. After this regression, there needed to be a few significant tweaks to the
data to get results that worked.
b. Regression 2
After comparing the results from regression 1 to some of the graphs (viewable in
appendix 1), especially the Patent-DODspending graph seen in Figure 4, using aerospace
as an industry no longer seemed practically viable in a regression. As previously
discussed, the long contractual agreements of the aerospace industry make the data
analysis nonviable. Also, if one views the cluster specialization-patent graph (Appendix
1), the aerospace industry appears to have a negative trend, which could be contributing
to the negative coefficient in the regressions. Therefore, that industry was removed.
As the regression process went on, there was a shift in how this thesis measured
the output of industrial policy. It became apparent that patents might not be the best
measure of progress from investment due to the fact that they are simply a number rather
than a monetary amount. The issue with this, as we see throughout the graphs detailed in
Appendix 1, is that different industries have widely varying levels of patent output. For
example, the ICT industry sees tens of thousands of new patents per year, whereas the
Aerospace industry might only see a few hundred (but, Aerospace patents could be
“worth” more in dollar terms, thus adding further confusion). However, if one uses value
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added as the primary left side variable, then the direct growth in that particular industry
as a result of changes in cluster specialization and DOD spending can be measured.
As we see in Chapter 2, Porter et al. explains that the greater the cluster
specialization, the stronger the external economies should be. However, combined with
the new information that perhaps it matters which industry the government chooses, it
could be that DOD spending is actually impacted by how strong cluster specialization is.
For example, the amount of value added gained from a particular DOD investment would
actually be contingent on the specialization level of a given cluster. This led to another
change for regression 2, in that it includes an interaction term to capture this
“DODspend*clusterspec”. This concept is not new, since it is truly the essence of what
industrial policy is. When a government is trying to figure out where to spend their
money, they have to decide what industry to spend it on. Krugman (1983) emphasizes
this idea by stating that an explicit industrial policy “may include general incentives for
capital formation, R&D, retraining of labor, and so on, but it will also almost surely
involve ‘targeting’ of industries thought to be of particular importance.” In addition,
there was evidence of serial correlation in regression 2, so the AR(1) term was included
to take care of that problem (spreads out the error terms to avoid this).
In regression 2, interaction term is positive, R&D is positive and significant at the
5% level, and the AR(1) variable is positive and significant even at the 1% level.
However, this regression results are far from perfect given that the interaction variable
only had a P value of 0.178, but the interaction term’s p value was improved in
subsequent regressions. Using the data from Regression 2, a real world example is
exhibited below in Figure 5.
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Figure 5
δ(Value Added)/δ(DODspend) = 238.99 (Cluster Spec)
Then use the median cluster spec data point for each industry (Location Quotient) .
Biopharmaà238.99(0.446) = $106.58 Million of Value Added
ICTà 238.99(0.458) = $109.45 Million of Value Added
In the Biopharmaceutical industry, for example, a $1 million increase in DOD
spending should result in a $106.58 million increase in value added. However, if the
cluster specialization number were higher, we would expect to see an even greater gain in
value added as a result of a $1 million increase in DOD spending.
c. Regression 3
As with the second regression, the final, and most promising regression excluded
the Aerospace industry due to the fact that it did not fit with the model. In addition, the
interaction term was kept as well because of the promising results from regression 2. For
both regressions 3 and 4, the primary goal was to make the interaction term significant,
but both have tradeoffs.
The primary change in regression three was changing AR(1) to AR(2), and
essentially this means that the serial correlation corrects for two years prior instead of
one. Another change was the inclusion of patents to test if increased levels of patents had
any impact on value added. The hypothesis was that the greater patents/innovation in a
sector, the greater the value added. The results of this regression were even more
promising, but with a few issues. In this regression, every single one of the core variables
(patents, the interaction term, R&D, and AR(2)) were significant at the 5% level. This
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was a very promising result, however the only problem was that the patent variable was
negative, which was not the anticipated sign.
d. Regression 4
The final regression attempted to maintain the strong significance of all the
variables while also getting rid of the patent variable since it had the wrong sign in
regression 3. This regression was essentially the same as regression three, and as a result
there were similarly strong results, with one exception. In this case, the AR(2) variable
was only significant at the 20% variable. However, given the shortage of data,
regressions three and four are likely the one of the best ways to estimate the effect of an
explicit U.S cluster-based industrial policy without the actual policy being put into
practice.
G. Implications
There are a lot of promising results from the statistical analysis, and it provides a
strong case for a cluster based U.S industrial policy. As seen from the graphing data,
there is clearly a relationship between the specialization levels of a cluster and its output
in terms of value added or innovation. The same goes for governmental investment; there
is a positive and significant relationship between DOD spending and positive output in
terms of innovation and value added. However, a key revelation from this data is the need
for an interaction term when conducting research. The decision of what clusters to invest
in does matter for government. With this in mind, there are fundamental problems with
the data, most significantly that there is a real shortage of both spending data and R&D
data. For example, the DOD spending data gathered from the USA Spending database
only provides data dating back to 2007. This is an issue that likely will be solved with
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time, because more and more data will become available, however for this thesis it likely
contributed to a lot of the practical problems in the regression analysis.
Porter’s (2012) hypothesis that clusters appear to have a positive relationship with
innovation and investment appears to be confirmed by these results, and they suggest that
there are real benefits to an explicit industrial policy. The explicit industrial policy was
something proposed by scholars such as Montero (2001) in the form of “horizontal
embeddedness” and this thesis confirms the value of a more direct approach to industrial
policy. As these results suggest, even a small investment can lead to huge gains in value
added (contingent on the specialization levels of the cluster). Therefore, the results of the
statistical analysis are encouraging, but certainly not without fault.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

A. Review of Findings
In 1983 Krugman argued that “At some point in the next decade, the U.S. will
probably adopt an explicit industrial policy,” (Krugman, 1983) and yet, this prediction
has yet to come to fruition over 30 years later. However, it is true that the current U.S.
form of industrial policy through DOD spillovers is likely not capitalizing on the
potential gains that would come from a more explicit program. This thesis set out to
propose a new form of explicit, cluster-based industrial policy specifically tailored to the
United States, and by using such a program, the United States could potentially see
significant gains in employment, income inequality, innovation, and industrial growth.
The previous literature from scholars such as Porter (2012), Montero (2001), and
Wade (2016) has laid the groundwork for this proposal, and their contributions have
strong ties throughout this thesis. Porter in particular had derived the idea of clusters as
an economic area (EA) that takes advantage of external economies. His work noted the
substantial gains to employment, innovation, and growth within stronger clusters, and
that is the basis for targeting clusters in this industrial policy proposal.
This thesis derived a model for this industrial policy proposal to statistically
measure the impact of such a policy if it were used in the United States. To do this, a
model that uses DOD expenditure, a measure of cluster specialization (how strong a
cluster is), patent data, value added, and R&D was used. In addition, the data used were
panel data, meaning that the data ranged from a period of 7 years (2007-2013) across
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three carefully chosen industries. These industries were chosen in an effort to accurately
depict distinct areas of U.S trade as it exists today. The graphic analysis revealed some
interesting patterns that suggested a positive relationship between DOD expenditure,
cluster specialization, value added, and R&D with patents. However, it became clear that
patents was not a viable measure of industrial policy output for regression analysis due to
the fact that the units were in real numbers but every other variable was in dollars. This,
and the fact that each industry (especially the Aerospace industry) was so different, made
it difficult to use patents as the dependent variable in the regression. However, when
excluding the Aerospace industry, using value added as the dependent variable, and an
interaction term (between cluster specialization and DOD spending) there were positive
and significant results.
B. Recommendations for Future Research
The results gained from this thesis are promising, but also confirm the necessity
of greater research into this particular policy proposal. In particular, the results from the
regression analysis were encouraging, but there were a few notable issues, primarily with
the lack of data available at the time of writing this thesis. However, this opens the door
for promising future research. For some regressions, there were only 10 observations
available, but this is simply because of the lack of both DOD spending data and value
added data. The DOD spending data only dates back to 2007, so there will need to be
further research done on this particular policy when more data inevitably becomes
available. In addition, future research should potentially focus on finding a new set of
industries to examine, because perhaps those will yield differing/stronger results. If in the
future, a form of explicit industrial policy is incorporated into the United States trade
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strategy, then at this point there could be some interesting research done on its real world
impact. However, the policy that has been put forth in this thesis is primarily meant to be
a starting point, a first step in the direction of making truly explicit industrial policy a
reality in the United States. There are clusters that are ripe for U.S industrial policy
intervention, and if they are capitalized on, then there could be substantial gains for the
U.S. If future researchers are able to expand on the work of this thesis, or even derive a
new proposal as a result of this work, then perhaps an explicit industrial policy in the
United States is closer than we think.
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APPENDIX 1

Appendix 1: Figure 1

Appendix 1: Figure 2
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Appendix 1: Figure 3

Appendix 1: Figure 4
Eviews Variable Name

Definition

CLUSTERSPEC

Measure of cluster specialization using the
location quotient. The higher this number,
the greater the cluster specialization.
Measure of expenditure by year from the
DOD in a given sector. Units: millions of
dollars
Interaction term between cluster
specialization and DOD spending. Change
in dependent variable is contingent on
specialization level of cluster.
Measure of research and development in a
given industry. Units: millions of dollars.
Measure of value added in a given industry
in millions of dollars (size of industry).
Measure of innovation by taking # of new
patent registrations in a given year (by
industry)
Eviews tool to correct serial error
correlation. Creates a lag for the error terms
of 1 (or 2 years)

DODSPEND

DODSPEND*CLUSTERSPEC

R_D
VALUE_ADDED
PATENTS

AR(1)/AR(2)
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APPENDIX 2
Appendix 2: Regression 1

Appendix 2: Regression 2
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Appendix 2: Regression 3

Appendix 2: Regression 4
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